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Abstract 
Japan’s corporate governance and employment relations systems have been under considerable 
pressures to reform towards a more Anglo-American model, against a back-drop of intensified global 
competition and slow economic growth over two ‘lost’ decades. But what is the relationship between 
these systems, and specifically, how does corporate governance structure condition employment 
relations practice? This paper adopts the ‘Systems, Society, Dominance and Corporate effects’ 
framework in order to contextualize and evaluate the outcomes of these pressures, particularly in the 
period following the 2007-8 global financial crisis. It reports case study data from various parts of the 
Japanese economy drawn from a series of firm-based interviews and a variety of secondary sources. It is 
argued that there has been a strong degree of continuity in certain employment practices, such as 
lifetime employment, even in relatively new high technology firms, but that the pattern for other 
practices, such as seniority-based pay, is more mixed with increasing differentiation between industries 
and individual organizations. We articulate a layered assessment of the varying SSDC effects at play in 
corporate Japan. This differentiation across industries and organizations is a function both of strategic 
choice (corporate effects) and also the increasing variation in the meso-level institutional pressures that 
are experienced at organizational level; that is, the differentiation in the sources and nature of dominance 
effects that are relevant. 
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Introduction 
Global macro-economic changes are purportedly having a significant impact on national and corporate 
business systems, with heightened effects since the 2007-8 global financial crisis. These changes include 
intensified global competition brought about because of liberalization and heightened competition from 
mature economies and the emergence of new entrants. In response to this heightened competition, 
corporate governance and employment systems are under pressure to reform, particularly economies such 
as Japan and Germany (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Keizer, 2008; 2009; Koike, 2015; McCann, 2013; 
Witt, 2006), which are being pressed to adopt more liberalized, dominant, Anglo-American forms of 
governance and employment relations by varying combinations of investors, governments and business 
groups (Jacoby, 2005; Witt and Redding, 2013). 
 
The Japanese employment relations model is predicated upon a certain set of corporate governance 
structures. While recent research focusing on corporate governance in Japan indicates significant 
changes for established Japanese companies, those studies focusing on employment relations report 
limited change, that is, continuity in the practices for ‘core’ workers combined with some diversifying of 
practices for ‘peripheral’ workers (Keizer, 2009). The interdependence between corporate governance 
structures and employment relations practices has been previously noted, particularly with regard to the 
case of corporate Japan (Aoki, 1990; Aoki  et al., 2007; Jackson 2009), but there is limited evidence of 
the dynamics between these two elements over time (Vidal, 2014). In other words, existing research 
does not provide concrete insights into how corporate governance structures condition employment 
relations practice over periods of time. This is at least in part because the Varieties of Capitalism 
approach has dominated the literature. We use rich qualitative data to explore the specific organizational 
nature of change in addressing this question. In order to embrace variation, the research uses case studies 
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of both older and more recently established organizations to explore change at the organizational level 
and broader system-wide effects.  
 
Theoretically, we adopt the recent extension of the Systems, Society and Dominance (SSD) framework 
(Smith and Meiksins 1995) provided by Delbridge, Hauptmeier and Sen Gupta (2011) which introduces 
corporate effects as a fourth influence on organizational outcomes. This allows us to address the greater 
degree of differentiation and strategic choice that is to be found in our own data and has also been recently 
reported by others commenting on developments in Japan (Aoki and Jackson, 2008; Aoki et al, 2007; 
Jackson, 2009). The paper makes the following contributions. First, the paper presents an empirical 
application demonstrating the analytical value of the Systems, Society, Dominance and Corporate Effects 
(SSDC) model in order to explicate the variation of employment relations practice to be found within the 
Japanese economy. The paper shows how strategic choices conditioned by other socio-economic effects 
explain the outcomes of meso-level institutional pressures on specific organizations. Second, the paper 
draws on recent institutional theory that explores the nature of complexity to be found in contexts with 
multiple situational logics. We elaborate the significance of organizations operating in multiple, 
overlapping organizational fields in understanding the potential implications of such meso-level 
institutional complexity. Specifically, applying these insights alongside the SSDC framework illuminates 
how different dominance effects are experienced by corporations within specific industry sectors, 
producing differentiated and layered outcomes. 
 
The paper is divided into the following sections. Next we evaluate the literature on changes to both 
Japanese corporate governance and employment systems in Japan and clarify our central research question. 
The subsequent section reviews the theoretical context and, in particular, the SSD framework as originally 
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developed by Smith and Meiksins (1995) and recently elaborated by Delbridge et al (2011). We then 
present the data in the form of five, interview-based, case studies, drawn from across a variety of sectors 
of the Japanese economy.  Finally, discussion and conclusion sections develop a series of insights and 
contributions. 
 
Changes to corporate governance and employment relations in Japan 
The recent research on employment relations in Japanese companies reports partial changes, with the 
emphasis on the increasing discrepancy between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ across various industrial sectors 
(Shibata, 2016; Yamauchi, 2016; Yun, 2016). Contrastingly, contemporary studies on Japan’s corporate 
governance clearly indicate significant changes, in particular, for established larger Japanese companies 
(Chizema & Shinozawa, 2012; Colpan et al 2011; Geng et al., 2016). Although it has only rarely been 
explicitly addressed in recent research (for exceptions, see Aoki  et al., 2007; Jackson 2009), the 
Japanese employment relations model has long been recognized as predicated upon a certain set of 
corporate governance practices. This model was classically articulated in Aoki’s (1990) seminal paper. 
He argued that the Japanese model was based on the relationship between the keiretsu corporate 
groupings and the main banks, and on the extensive cross shareholding by other firms in the corporate 
group. This has enabled large Japanese firms to be far less reliant on market trading for shares and 
enabled managers to operate a stakeholder model, accountable to a variety of constituent groups, 
including employees and suppliers, in the ‘company as community’ system (Inagami and Whittaker, 
2005), albeit the risks and consequences were largely passed onto ‘peripheral’ firms and employees.  
 
Such a form of corporate governance is part of wider interlocking arrangements of institutional systems, 
the reinforcing effects of complementarities, including the employment relations system, in which 
5 
 
employees have been, historically, protected by the stakeholder model. However, according to Dore 
(2009), this corporate governance system has been transformed over the previous ten-to-twenty years. 
This pronouncement was fairly dramatic as he had been a pioneer of Japanese workplace studies and, as 
late as 2000, was defending the continued uniqueness of a coordinated market economy model centred 
on Japan and Germany (Dore, 2000). Less than ten years later, however, Dore was arguing that 
shareholder interests had increased dramatically in importance in Japan and that a significant market for 
corporate control had emerged, including take-overs. He concluded that the conversion to the theology 
of shareholder sovereignty seemed complete (Dore, 2009).   
 
Thus the pattern of corporate governance in Japanese firms has changed markedly since the immediate 
post-bubble crisis of the 1990s, with both the relationships between firms and main banks and cross 
shareholding weakening. Keiretsu relationships were also weakening, and corporate finance was 
becoming both more market orientated and under foreign control (Jacoby, 2005; Aoki  et al., 2007; 
Jackson 2009; Witt, 2006). In 1989, for example, just before the bubble burst, 3.6% of shares on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange were held by foreigner interests, by 2013 this was 26.9%. Pressures emerged 
from both inside and outside of Japan for system reform, in order to improve the strategic direction and 
international competitiveness of Japanese firms. These included general global economic pressures, the 
impact of the ‘lost decades’, moves to global sourcing on the part of multinational firms and the 
‘hollowing out’ of the Japanese economy, all essentially systemic pressures to reform. In addition there 
have been reform pressures both from foreign owned firms and investors with, for example, significant 
pressures for shareholder sovereignty from both the US government, from foreign investor funds and 
from US owned companies (Olcott, 2009). Thus globalization of capital markets has added pressures 
toward shareholder value. For example, Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005) describe the tensions in 
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companies between foreign portfolio investors and domestic relational shareholders, with considerable 
pressures coming from foreign investors. Dore (2009) notes that there were also significant pressures 
from within Japan, from investors, government and business groups. The Japanese legal system has been 
more favourable to market-based solutions for the last 15 years, with holding companies, for example, 
legalized, making merger and acquisition activity easier. Japanese pension funds and banks, particularly 
non-keiretsu ones, have also been critical of the stakeholder model, with banks investing in hedge funds 
which insist on shareholder supremacy. Government and business groups have supported these moves, 
the former seeing this as a way to make the Japanese economy more efficient and to attract foreign 
capital. Colpan et al. (2011) have investigated the effects of the changing institutional environment upon 
the strategic orientation of Japanese electronics firms. They note that firms with foreign portfolio 
investors are characterized by influences pressing for changing corporate strategies and financial 
investors having a much more market-orientated approach. Furthermore, Chizema and Shinozawa 
(2012) explore the rise of a more Anglo-American form of corporate governance among large Japanese 
firms, exemplified by the rise of the committee system of governance. They found that firms that were 
more internationally exposed were more likely to adopt a committee system, as were firms with larger 
proportions of foreign ownership. Moreover, banks were gradually withdrawing from their monitoring 
function. The consensus from the literature would seem to be that changes in corporate governance are 
substantial for larger older firms at least. 
 
Another set of reforms liberalized labour markets on the use of temporary and agency workers. 
Employment relations had been characterized by the three ‘pillars’ of life-time employment, seniority-
based pay and enterprise unions which included not only white collar workers but also blue collar ones 
(Koike, 2015). These conditions only applied to a minority of the workforce, elite male full time core 
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workers in large firms, and thus there were significant differences in employment practices based on 
firm size, gender and sector (manufacturing-services) and in supply chains. However, they had a major 
normative effect on wider Japanese society (Matanle, 2003), and medium-sized enterprises tried to 
emulate their larger counterparts, not least to attract skilled labour (Whittaker, 2009).  
 
Post-1990, the Japanese economy had been through three fundamental, inter-related, structural changes, 
namely de-industrialization and a growth of services, a growth of the non-regular workforce and a 
growth in the female workforce. Against the backdrop of these changes, the existing research illustrates 
a partial shift in Japan’s employment relations. In the case of lifetime employment much of the evidence 
points to a great deal of continuity of this practice (Kambayashi and Kato, 2016; Keizer, 2009). Keizer’s 
findings from case studies of four Japanese industrial sectors support continued attachment to lifetime 
employment, but he also argues that despite the hype surrounding the introduction of more output 
orientated performance pay, its impact had been modest as performance measures had largely been 
grafted, or layered, on to existing labour market institutions, particularly seniority. However, there are 
several important caveats; lifetime employment applies to far fewer managers per corporation, as a 
consequence of managerial downsizing, delayering and recruitment freezes and companies have shrunk 
the duration of the lifetime element considerably, to 50 years and younger (Authors Ref; Kato, 2001). 
Furthermore, the practice of shukko, in which workers are temporarily ‘transferred’ to group subsidiaries 
may also have been subject to modification, in the sense that it has become permanent and strategic 
(Chuma, 2002).  Kambayashi and Kato (2016), meanwhile offer a rigorous analysis of long term 
employment in Japan over 25 years, in a comparison with the US. Although their data only run to 2007, 
they found long term employment particularly resilient in Japan, a surprise given predictions of its 
demise and that their analysis coincided with the so called ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s. This contrasted 
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with the US where average tenure declined, despite a period of economic growth. The slight caveats to 
this were that for younger employees long term employment had declined (although it resumed in their 
30s) and the growing presence of mid career hires, indicating segmentation of the labour market. 
 
Moreover, seniority-based pay is to a certain extent being sacrificed in order to maintain lifetime 
employment (Watanabe, 2000), with performance-related pay the strategy introduced to control labour 
costs of regular employees (Keizer, 2009). However, significance of output in performance in 
performance pay was fairly limited and certainly not on the scale seen in US corporations (Hassard et al, 
2009). Nevertheless, perhaps the greatest change to the seniority system has been in the proportion of 
managers being promoted. Potentially, this poses issues of modification to the ‘tournament’ model of 
late promotion (Kato et al., 2016; Koike, 2005; Owen, 2004). As a consequence of delayering, far fewer 
managers are now being automatically promoted than was hitherto the case, due to significantly reduced 
promotion opportunities.  
 
The final pillar is enterprise unionism, with such unions a product of a post-war management-labour 
settlement (Whittaker, 2009). Bargaining tends to take place at the enterprise level, but the annual 
Shunto wage offensive (where the union in a large employer takes a lead role) has had a strong 
normative influence both on nation-wide settlements, but also on wage restraint. Enterprise unions have 
faced a ‘perfect storm’ of adverse conditions, including structural economic change, ‘hollowing out’ of 
manufacturing, a growth in services, feminization and a growth of non-regular employment, with a 
dramatic decline in both union membership numbers and organization rates. While such trends are found 
across OECD economies, they were exacerbated to a certain extent by the nature of Japanese unionism 
as enterprise unions, by definition, were generally not recruiting in the new growth industries and, by 
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and large, were not organizing non-regular employees. Moreover, unions have become increasingly 
marginalized in national-level policy change negotiations, despite continued resistance to these changes 
(Shibata, 2016; Yun, 2016). Furthermore, union members began to question the raison d’etre of their 
membership, as the interviewees in the case studies indicate. 
 
Research assessing these developments in employment relations has often been based on surveys, useful 
in that they provide widespread coverage of the economy. Aoki and Jackson (2008), for example, use 
large-scale survey data to point to a fragmentation of the employment relations system, and Ishida and 
Sato (2011) argue that this is representative of a widespread paradigm shift towards employment 
relations decided by the market, particularly performance-related pay which emphasizes individual or 
group output. However, other studies have raised questions over any sweeping assumptions of change 
based on large-scale surveys. For example, Sekiguchi (2013) argues that the introduction of an 
individual or group output-related pay element into the pay systems of Japanese companies is a 
consequence of Japanese management fashion which quickly spread through Japanese business 
networks between 1995 and 2005, and became institutionalized as a ‘rationalized myth’. Organizations 
were also keen to embrace what was seen as a progressive American practice and which fit the ‘crisis’ in 
Japanese management at the time, but Sekiguchi also points to Japanese government survey data which 
indicate significant implementation problems. The macro-data also have some other weaknesses, 
particularly when trying to gauge the extent of the use of seniority-based pay. Hassard et al (2009), for 
example, found a number of respondents reporting the introduction of output-related but the amounts 
were relatively small and confined. Furthermore, seniority still guided promotion. Sekiguchi (2013) 
further argues that many large Japanese companies have reconsidered introducing performance pay due 
to managerial and employee opposition. 
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In short, there would seem to be considerable evidence of modifications to Japan’s system of corporate 
governance, particularly for the larger and more established companies, certain elements of which have 
historically been considered to shape the foundations of Japanese employment relations. However, 
evidence of changes in employment relations has been more limited and partial in recent years. There 
has been limited recent work seeking to explore the inter-relationships between corporate governance 
and employment practices. The central objective of this paper therefore is to revisit the link between 
changes in corporate governance and those in employment relations. In other words, what are the meso-
level and corporate effects, including changes in corporate governance structure, that have influenced 
the nature of change (and continuity) in employment relations? The next section introduces the 
theoretical framework that we use to examine the link between corporate governance and employment 
relations in Japan. 
 
The System, Society, Dominance, and Corporate Effects framework 
In order to revisit and explicate the link between corporate governance structures and employment 
relations in Japanese companies, we adopt a framework that can embrace institutional structures and 
socio-economic factors as well as strategic choice of companies. There is a long history of research on 
comparative work and employment relations dating back to the 1970s (Dore, 1973; Maurice et al., 1986; 
Vidal and Hauptmeier, 2014). This has taken various forms but Hall and Soskice’s (2001) Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) framework has proved particularly influential. This literature is nationally-focused 
and contrasts liberal-market (LME) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). Essentially, this debate 
is concerned with national-level governance, including the nature of the links between companies, their 
sources of finance and patterns of employment relations. The VoC approach has been influential in 
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addressing institutional variety between different economies. Furthermore, recent development of the 
VoC approach, as represented by Thelen (2008), pays more attention to actors, arguing that there is a 
dynamic, with Germany moving to a more segmented, dualistic and layered form of CME and Japan 
moving to an LME form. However, there are criticisms that it is deterministic, ahistorical and top-down 
(Vidal and Hauptmeier, 2014) and thus faces difficulty in explaining the variation within a particular 
economy. 
 
Recent work exploring developments in Japan has moved beyond the conventional VoC approach in 
order to document the empirical variety that is observable. Notably, Jackson (2009) has sought to track 
in detail variation concerning employment relations and corporate governance. He argues that large 
Japanese firms are fairly homogenous in terms of lifetime employment, board practices and 
decentralization, but heterogeneous in terms of the role of output in performance pay, finance 
arrangements and foreign ownership. Importantly, his research distinguished between three broad 
responses to socio-economic challenges at firm level. First, minimal adaptation of the model (relying on 
bank funds, low shareholder influence, lifetime employment etc.), typical of firms in old industrial 
sectors. Second, a Type I hybrid, mixed market-orientated finance and ownership characteristics with 
traditional employment practices. This category included manufacturing exporters who have relocated 
production overseas and retained R&D activities in Japan. Finally, Type II hybrids are characterized by 
traditional bank finance and inter-firm relations but a more market orientated employment relations. 
These tend to be newer firms, dependent on external labour markets and competing in global markets. 
Jackson argues that this diversity is representative of greater strategic choice and the loosening of 
institutional constraints.  
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We agree with the overall direction of Jackson’s (2009) research, and introduce here a systematic 
analytical framework that allows for variation within institutional arrangements and organizational 
practices; that is, a framework that addresses both the socio-economic factors impacting on companies 
and their strategic choices. To enable our examination of the inter-relationship between developments in 
corporate governance and employment practices, we adopt and adapt the SSDC framework by 
embracing the role of corporate governance as a part of Corporate Effects. We will now explain this 
approach in more detail. Smith and Meiksins’ (1995) SSD model aimed to interpret cross-national 
organization and provide a holistic framework for understanding the work of management and 
employees within internationalizing firms. Further, and importantly, whereas the VoC model is 
essentially ahistorical and assumes homogeneity within the economy, SSD effects are likely to be 
stabilized in periods of institutional settlement, but prone to adaptation in a period of institutional 
change. As McSweeney and colleagues later noted, the framework can encapsulate national-level and 
local-level routines, and the impact of international competition and global ‘best practice’ concepts. 
Individual work-place outcomes are a product of the interaction of these various effects (McSweeney et 
al., 2008).  
 
The SSD model posited interaction at three levels. The Systems level emphasizes the political and 
economic system (capitalism or state socialism) at a general level, with the core features such as 
competitive market relations and wage labour. As such, these effects are essentially and consistently 
‘capitalist’ for all the firms in this case (and are thus effectively ignored). Society effects reflect the fact 
that firms are societally-embedded, both in a formal, institutional, sense and in a normative one, in that 
societal norms shape business behaviour. The final level, Dominance effects, are essentially leading-
edge, globally dominant methods of organization which are both hegemonic and internationally 
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emulated. These take the form of either dominant sectors or individual firms, such as has been the case 
for Toyota or the Japanese car industry. As Smith and others note, this allows for firms to borrow, or 
adapt, practices by, for example, recruiting managers from firms from other countries. Elger and Smith 
(2005), for example, later used the dominance effects in interpreting their research findings on Japanese 
firms in England. In this article, we further elaborate dominance effects. That is, in relation to the 
analytical focus of this paper, changing elements of corporate governance that are driven by 
expectations of the adoption of an Anglo-American model can be understood as a part of dominance 
effects. This is because the perception of ‘best practice’ partly depends on the voice of influential 
audiences such as ‘active’ shareholders. 
 
In seeking to allow for greater recognition of the strategic choice available to corporate actors, Delbridge 
et al. (2011) added a fourth level, Corporate effects. This provides for a degree of agency in that it 
allows for recognition of how workplace actors may make local settlements and, in particular, 
acknowledges the place that an individual workplace has within the wider strategy (and corporate 
division of labour) of the parent firm. In summary, this SSDC framework promises a more sophisticated 
attempt to understand the layered nature of meso-level institutional effects and the scope for actors’ 
agency in operating within these. This is particularly valuable in assessing the implications of 
institutional complexity on organizational outcomes which has been the recent subject of theorizing in 
organization studies.  
 
Institutional complexity in organization studies refers to situations where actors are faced by multiple 
potentially incompatible institutional logics (Greenwood et al, 2011). There has been considerable recent 
attention paid to questions of how multiple institutional logics, shaped by meso-level structures and 
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processes, are experienced within organizations and how actors respond in the face of such complexity. 
This work is valuable in highlighting the influences and constraints on actors, and in recognizing the 
multi-level nature of institutional effects. Earlier work in institutional theory has emphasized the 
historical, path-dependent and negotiated nature to organizational change. An important paper by 
Cooper et al (1996), looking at continuity and change in Canadian law firms, describes the 
‘sedimentation’ of one organizational form on to the previous form, allowing for a contested and 
dialectical view of change rather than a linear one in which the ‘new’ displaces the ‘old’. There are, of 
course, further alternatives for examining the within-country variations in employment systems and 
management practices. One such alternative has been advanced in research through the lens of personnel 
economics, and particularly recent work that has concentrated on human resource management (HRM) 
(Bloom and van Reenen, 2011). In particular it relates to the growing introduction of incentive pay 
(particularly group-type bonuses) to productivity, and to these being linked ‘bundles’ of practices which 
are typified by a training-intensive regime contingent on certain forms of labour regulation, including 
lifetime employment. These ideas complement the SSDC model in allowing the historically grounded, 
institutionally embedded and contested nature of organization to be fully recognized.  
 
In summary, this paper represents an early attempt to undertake a detailed research project using the 
SSDC framework outlined by Smith and Meiksins (1995), elaborated by Delbridge et al (2011), and 
here developed to embrace key insights from institutional theory. We use this analytic framework 
because it allows for a more integrated assessment of the global and national systemic and structural 
contingencies that are informing developments at local workplace and organizational levels. In doing so, 
it also allows for an evaluation of the strategic choices of corporate actors (Child, 1997), crucial if local 
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variance and complex empirical circumstances of continuity and change are to be appreciated and 
assessed. 
 
Methods 
The research presented here is based on a series of 68 interviews from five case study organizations. 
Prior research on corporate Japan has tended to concentrate on large and established manufacturing 
organizations, but these concerns are no longer so representative of the economy, as they have 
downsized and relocated overseas, and service industries have grown (Authors Refs; Bailey, 2003). 
Moreover, as noted above, Aoki et al. (2007) and Jackson (2009) have contended that Japanese firms 
have become increasingly diverse, both in terms of their corporate governance and employment 
relations. Furthermore, most importantly, in order to address the research question, embracing 
companies from various industrial sectors is crucial in order to examine variety regarding how corporate 
governance structure impacts on employment relations practice.  Consequently, we used a form of 
purposive sampling, which collects data from samples that meet the purpose of the research rather than 
randomly. In order to gain maximum variation, we picked firms from a wide variety of segments, 
including: a firm from the service sector, in this case a relatively recent start-up in retailing; a large 
traditional engineering manufacturing firm operating in highly internationalized environment; a 
privatized company, in our case a telecommunications provider; a firm from the ‘new industry’ sector 
(internet and games-related); a new economy, service sector firm, in this case a mobile 
telecommunications network provider. To this extent, the cases cover both economy- and systems-wide 
changes in Japan, as well as changes to more traditional firms. Access to these firms was secured 
through a combination of previous research contacts and the close contacts of Japanese university 
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colleagues. One additional firm (in the internet and games-related industry) was approached but refused 
(we later found out that they were undergoing major restructuring). 
This mix of sectors gives a broader representation than previous, manufacturing-dominated, research, 
and offers  insights into the varieties of employment relations in these different groups. The research 
employed two methodologies, both qualitative. The first method was semi-structured interviews with 68 
managers across the firms, including 12 with board-level members and the remainder across the 
managerial and managerial-track hierarchy. The former interviewees were key informants in senior HR 
positions. The second method involved secondary data sources, including the Nikkei Shimbun 
newspaper, annual reports, corporate brochures and the Nikkei telecom electronic data base. We also did 
a search of the books on the firms’ histories, identifying a total of 28 books. Further, the data were used 
in broad terms to explore the interaction of societal, dominance and corporate effects which will be used 
to interpret the findings. The interviews were carried out in both Japanese and English (one of the 
interviewers was a native Japanese speaker). The data were recorded, translated where appropriate (by 
one of the research team) and transcribed. The dataset was then divided thematically and analyzed as 
such. 
Data collection and analysis proceeded in three stages. First, we examined the secondary data, in order 
to obtain basic, background information on the case study firms, establishing contacts with case firms 
and ‘fine-tuning’ the interview questions. The interview questions were divided into four broad 
categories, with a focus on change and continuity in General Context; Corporate Strategy; Corporate 
Governance, and Employment Relations. Furthermore, we developed questions on specific issues related 
to these themes, such as the introduction of new employment contracts, acquisition of, or by, foreign 
firms, appointment of foreign directors and so forth. Second, we then conducted the semi-structured 
interviews. All but four were recorded and transcribed. In these exceptions, the informants requested 
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that they were not recorded, but transcriptions were made from notes. The interview data were analyzed 
using Max-qda, computer-aided qualitative analysis software, were loaded onto the software and 
classified in line with the four categories. Further, the memo function was used to associate these with 
the secondary data. Given our interest in understanding the specifics of how pressures for reform are 
manifesting themselves at organizational level, and because of the particularities of each case 
organization, we proceed to present our key findings on a case-by-case basis after briefly reviewing 
demographic data related to our case study firms. 
 
Case Studies  
The case study firms were not chosen as ‘maverick’ examples but, as indicated, were chosen to illustrate 
developments in certain segments of the Japanese economy. They were as follows; MatureCo, an old, 
large electronics keiretsu; PrivatizedCo, a former state owned telecomms entity; RetailCo, a relatively 
recent start-up; NewTelecommsCo (NTC) a mid aged private provider; and, TechnoCo, a relatively 
young internet related firm. Table 1 shows establishment dates of companies in the relevant industries, 
while Table 2 shows the size distribution. These give the demography of firms in related industries (it 
includes firms with 50 plus workers with capitalization of 30 million yen plus). MatureCo is one of the 
older and larger firms in this sector but was purposely chosen as such to illustrate change in this type of 
firm. TechnoCo, RetailCo and NTC were broadly of a similar age and size to their competitors. 
 
Our purpose is to explain changes in employment relations by drawing on the SSDC framework in 
interpreting our findings.  
______________________Table 1 Here______________________ 
______________________Table 2 Here______________________ 
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PrivatizedCo is an old established telecommunications firm. In considering developments in 
PrivatisedCo under the SSDC evaluative framework, societal effects remained strong with continued 
lifetime employment, trade union presence and seniority pay, despite some limited dominance effects on 
the last of these and some clearly defined corporate effects in the use of subsidiaries to manage 
downsizing and preserve lifetime employment for the remaining core. This is, as seen below, because of 
relatively stable and less demanding shareholders as a part of Dominance Effects, which significantly 
conditioned the firm’s responses to increasingly intensified competition. 
 
PrivatizedCo was privatized in 1985 (Vogel, 2006). Nevertheless, the company largely retained its form 
of corporate governance and their civil-service-type employment relations form until the 1990s. In part 
this was due to the government maintaining a large golden share of the company (they were still the 
biggest shareholder in 2014) and they had maintained a monopoly position in the Japanese landline 
telecoms market. By 2000, however, their market position was being eroded in two ways. First, they 
were obliged to follow Japanese telecommunications technical standards which were out of line with 
international ones, a specific form of technological ‘lock-in’, and second, they faced considerable 
competition from foreign firms such as Samsung and Apple. The firm had diversified into data and 
Internet services and limited overseas expansion by acquisition. As a consequence of these gradually 
worsening market conditions, the firm could no longer operate as if it were a government agency. 
External directors were elected to the board and foreign shareholders allowed to buy-into the firm. 
Nevertheless the government retains a large stake (a third) and the firm has not faced the intense 
international competition that other of our case study companies have (although foreign investors 
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accounted for 25% of shares). As a consequence, employee relations were still fairly traditional. The 
firm employs around 290,000 employees and has maintained their lifetime employment system. 
However, any member of staff who had not become a director by the age of 50 had to leave the core 
company and was transferred to a subsidiary with worse terms and conditions. Arguably then, 
PrivatizedCo had been able to maintain its hierarchy and lifetime employment by its use of its 
subsidiaries (all of the employees in the core were full time and permanent). PrivatizedCo used its 
subsidiaries in a fairly traditional manner to protect its core business and employment relations. The firm 
had also maintained fairly traditional recruitment methods based on graduate hires, although there were 
increasing numbers of mid career hires. 
 
Despite the introduction of a more output-orientated performance-pay system (termed seikashugi), 
seniority was still the prime determinant of pay, although the proportion related to seniority was lower 
than previously. For promotion, it still took at least 15 years to be promoted to a managerial position and 
that was primarily based on seniority, i.e. age, and was closely related to pay. However, respondents also 
reported that fewer people were getting promoted (with employees far less likely to be promoted 
virtually automatically on the basis of time-served) and that the promotion that took place was related to 
individual appraisal. Interestingly, the firm had scrapped their fast track promotion scheme. Union 
presence and density remained strong in the company. 
 
MatureCo is an old, hundred-year plus, multidivisional general electric group, employing 300,000 
people plus 40,000 temporary workers. Overall outcomes concerning employment relations at MatureCo 
are similar to Privatized Co. While societal effects remained strong and continued to largely shape these 
in the current period, dominance effects also drove the firm to conduct reforms enabling cost reduction. 
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This is primarily because ‘active’ shareholders increasingly became influential and, to some extent, 
conditioned the firm’s strategic choice, in particular in relation to cost saving. 
 
MatureCo had undergone considerable restructuring and reorientation of its operations. These changes 
were in response to declining sales and profitability in core business areas, particularly in consumer 
electronics, due to intense international competition, the hollowing out of the economy and sluggish 
domestic demand. One relevant change in corporate governance was a departure from cross 
shareholding by main banks and keiretsu firms. Consequently, approximately 40 percent of shareholders 
became ‘foreigners’, who tended to be more ‘active’.  
 
As a result of these changes, the core group had discontinued production of certain, formerly core, 
product ranges (consumer electronics, semiconductors, home appliances), either ceasing production 
entirely, transferring production to subsidiaries or selling capacity to third parties. Subsidiaries were, 
therefore, used in this context to protect the well performing sections of the core group and to separate 
them from the non-core which faced a precarious position. Potentially, this had profound implications 
for the fairly traditional post-war settlement of employee relations, based on lifetime employment, 
seniority based pay and enterprise unions. However, these had undergone few changes during the 
restructuring. The company maintained their commitment to lifetime employment, albeit with certain 
caveats. First, far fewer employees were ‘guaranteed’ lifetime employment, given that the core company 
had divested subsidiaries. Second, it was only guaranteed to a certain age (similar to Private Co), older 
managers – typically over 50 – were routinely transferred to subsidiary firms, on worse pay and 
conditions. One of our respondents, for example, had started his career as a core group employee, but 
had been transferred to a subsidiary as CEO at 50. Moreover, the company had recruited significant 
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numbers of mid-career hires, who were set on positions on pay scales which reflected prior experience 
outside of MatureCo. Third, while younger employees were attracted by LTE, they were nevertheless 
considering future opportunities outside MatureCo. Five of our respondents were under 35 and all knew 
of managerial-grade employees who had left the organization and indicated that there was not the 
corporate attachment that there was understood to have been ten-to-twenty years ago.  This was also 
representative of changes to Japan’s labour markets. One of our younger respondents noted, in terms 
fairly unimaginable twenty years ago: ‘I guess it’s changing. I mean the external labour market is 
emerging in Japan, so they could find quite decent jobs [elsewhere]’. 
 
There were also certain moves to adapt the seniority pay system, part of a wider move to de-emphasize 
seniority for promotions and wage increases and to promote a more output orientated performance 
management (seika-shugi in 2000). This included formalizing the appraisal system and the introduction 
of job-type descriptions, part of a broader desire to introduce more output-related pay measures. 
However, such enthusiasm was curbed, to a certain extent, by the well publicized difficulties 
experienced by Fujitsu in this regard (Authors). Our research found clear changes to the pay system but 
they were of a fairly limited degree and respondents noted that output-related performance measures 
made little difference to individual pay. As one noted: ‘The important thing is the length of stay in the 
firm and I hate to say this but the firm adopts a demerit system, you don’t have to be that innovative [to 
get promoted]...but [simply] do things without mistakes’. Moreover, overall, fewer employees were 
eligible for higher pay, given core workforce decline, delayering, recruitment freezes etc. Another noted 
that, for promotion, ‘seniority was crucially important’ and further noted that differences in pay for 
young employees between the best and worst performers was only small. Promotion was very slow, 
seniority-orientated and it took 18 to 19 years to get promoted to the first managerial level. Further, far 
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fewer career track employees were getting promoted, particularly to the second managerial level, or 
bucho, than was previously the case, meaning that far fewer managers were getting promoted on the 
basis of seniority. While the individual appraisal element of pay was small (about 3%), it was a more 
important indicator of promotion prospects. Finally, there were differences in bonus payments between 
employees, but these were largely based on divisional, rather than corporate, performance, as was 
previously the case. Staff in poorly performing divisions were negatively evaluated and therefore 
received smaller amounts of additional pay. There were other changes to the pay system, but they were 
largely related to overall wage costs rather than individualizing the system. The pension system, for 
example, had been reformed with a lower level of corporate contribution, and corporate welfare 
contributions had also declined. 
 
The union remained an important part of the company, but there were indications that it was being 
marginalized, albeit based on a relatively small interview sample. Our respondents were largely young 
manager-track employees not blue collar workers, but nevertheless a number had either left the union or 
were doubting its worth to them. 
 
RetailCo is a relatively new company, founded in the 1990s, and is included here as it represents an 
example of the new Japanese economy and offers a contrast to how established firms have changed. In 
contrast to the first two companies, the management practices and employment system RetailCo was not 
illustrative of the conventional Japanese societal effects manifest in the three pillars. Their employment 
systems were far more US-style and thus dominance effects were far more evident in this case. The 
majority of the shares was for a period owned by an investment fund which was known for a ‘hands-on’ 
approach to its invested firms, thereby contributing to the Dominance Effects. Further, the use of the 
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franchise model informs the type of employment system in place and is, to a considerable extent 
corporation-specific, exemplifying the significance of corporate effects within the SSDC model. 
 
RetailCo’s main business is selling second hand books in stores across metropolitan Japan, although it 
had recently diversified into selling a variety of second hand goods, including sportswear, compact 
discs, clothes etc.  The firm had a high degree of external control, half of the directors were external and 
ownership was split between organizations, individuals and financial institutions. Formerly the firm had 
a high degree of ownership in the form of private equity fund. For a couple of years in the mid 2000s, a 
private equity investment firm became the largest shareholder. According to a manager, ‘we thought the 
firm would be one day owned by them and drastic restructuring may happen.’ However, in 2009, the 
private equity firm sold all the shares to several firms. The main expansion model had been through 
franchising, comprising 60% of properties. The firm had an extremely standardized operation, modelled 
on an Anglo-American form, more typical of new service industries in Japan, such as retailing. As a 
senior manager noted: ‘Our firm is quite a new type ...we don’t have ideas derived from Japanese 
firms... we are influenced by franchising, which is from the US… we studied many franchising 
businesses’. Partly as a consequence, employment practices were also very different from the other case 
studies, and not traditionally Japanese. A manager noted: ‘...the operation is very standardized... every 
branch has a store manager, an arubaito-san and part-timers, part-san’.      
 
 There was a degree of performance-pay based on appraisal, but the amounts were relatively small, 
related to overall company performance, and also only applied to full time employees with annual pay. 
At lower managerial levels, full time employees got paid a monthly salary, but at some stage they were 
switched to annual pay that had a larger individual performance-related element. The term lifetime, or 
24 
 
long term, employment was also fairly meaningless in the company, given the high proportion of part-
time staff and relatively high labour turnover. Other employment practices were also very standardized 
across the company. The store manager was responsible for the recruitment of part timers in the branch 
and they were supervised on a regular basis by an area manager. The firm recently introduced a new 
type of contract (called ‘area limited contract’) for full time workers who did not have to be transferred 
across branches. This was intended to accommodate various needs of full time employees, including 
taking care of children and nursing their ill parents. The company, however, suffered from high rates of 
labour turnover, partly reflecting the routine nature of the work. A store manager noted that: ‘Some can 
link the work with their growth.... but for many the work is repetitive and simple... so, unfortunately, 
many quit in a couple of years or less’. This was a sentiment shared by the HRM manager and was 
exacerbated by the company employing graduates (in boring repetitive jobs), the employment of many 
part time workers and because promotion opportunities were extremely limited. The company only 
provided long term prospects for a small number of staff, given its flat structure and, of the 10,000 
employees, 90% were part-time. Although there were some limited opportunities for part-time contracts 
to be converted to full-time ones, new graduates and mid career recruits were also recruited as full-time 
employees, and graduates took less than a year to be promoted to store manager. An experienced store 
manager could be promoted to area manager, but there was a limited number of these, and few of the 
directors were recruited internally and generally were drawn from other firms. The firm was, 
unsurprisingly, non-unionized, given the sector and the workforce composition.  
 
TechnoCo was established in 1998, in the IT bubble period. In terms of SSDC effects on employment 
relations, TechnoCo is a hybrid. Corporate effects have been locally produced by senior managers (for 
example, the promotion of internal entrepreneurialism and non-unionism) along with certain societal 
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effects (particularly over the commitment to long term employment and the nature of the career 
structure). Furthermore, with the percentage of ‘active’, ‘foreign’ shareholders over 40%, there have 
been discernible dominance effects in the use of subsidiary spin-offs to promote innovation and growth. 
 
The primary initial business was in internet-related domains, typically internet advertising sales. By 
2011, sales had reached 100 billion yen and revenue streams had diversified into internet and smart 
phone media, including applications. Venture financing was facilitated by government deregulation, 
with new stock markets established to provide venture companies access to funds and investors with 
more diversified products. Thus TechnoCo was listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Makers Division in 
2000, since when internally promoted directors were appointed to the board.  
 
The firm was started by three founders and only employed 20 people in 1999. Very significant growth 
saw this expand to 1000 full-time employees by 2005 and 30000 by 2013, excluding part-time and 
agency workers. This rapid expansion was partly achieved through the setting up of a series of spin-off 
subsidiaries, largely as a result of business ideas put forward by employees. Typically, these spin-off 
companies were also run by the people who came up with the business ideas, many of whom were 
extremely young to take up such senior positions, certainly by Japanese corporate standards. In this case, 
the use of subsidiaries was very different from the older established companies, PrivatizedCo and 
MatureCo. The rationale in TechnoCo was for subsidiary autonomy in order to provide them with the 
opportunity to have the freedom to innovate. At the time of interviews, there were 30 subsidiaries 
employing between 4 and 800, and there was a fairly high failure rate for subsidiaries (of 50%). Of the 
subsidiary employees interviewed, one was a 27 year old president of a company providing mobile 
phone applications and employing 800, while other presidents interviewed were 22 and 24 years of age.  
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As a relatively recent start up operating in a high technology sector, TechnoCo might have been 
expected to have a set of non-traditional employment practices, particularly given the young age of start-
up presidents. However, the firm had several characteristics associated with the traditional Japanese 
model, including long term employment, dense networks of employees and a preference for relying on 
organic growth rather than on merger and acquisition activity. The HRM director, for example, indicated 
that the firm had never laid-off a full time employee due to performance. He explained: ‘We do not have 
seniority, but do maintain long-term employment at any cost. If a manager achieves their output, it will 
simply reflect in his salary. If employees cannot make progress it is the managers’ fault. That is our 
basic principle’. Despite this commitment to long-term employment, a number of younger employees 
interviewed (including at subsidiary president level) indicated a willingness to leave the company at 
some stage in the future. However, this was not an expression of dissatisfaction with working for the 
firm but rather a desire to start-up their own high technology business (and the company had a labour 
turnover of 3% per annum). 
 
The company’s pay and promotion system was developed as an organizational hierarchy based on a 
simple grade system, and this was also adopted in subsidiaries. Initially the firm had a grade system 
based on a general track (G-Shoku) as at this time the firm was predominantly sales-based. However, as 
the firm diversified its products in the mid 2000s, it became increasingly technologically sophisticated 
and recruited increasing numbers of engineers and web designers. Thus they introduced an engineering, 
or specialized, grade (S-Shoku). The firm also added a non-career track (C-Shoku), often (but not 
exclusively) occupied by married females who could not commit to the working hours needed on the G 
grade. While there was a degree of movement back from C to G grade, one female interviewee (aged 36) 
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expressed dissatisfaction at being transferred from G to C grade as a consequence of having a child, 
complaining that work in the C grade was ‘second-rate with no decision making power’. The general 
track had five grades and the specialist one had seven, but at a certain point on the general track 
employees were expected to take on managerial responsibilities while specialized staff were not. The 
firm used both mid-career and new graduate recruitment. The Japanese IT labour market is well 
developed, despite an underdeveloped external market, unlike the US. However the organizational 
culture was predicated upon the recruitment of young graduate engineers (typically from top and second 
ranked universities), and mid career engineers were only recruited to rectify skill shortages brought 
about by the changing business environment. The organization was non-union and the douki network (a 
group based on incoming recruits) was viewed as an important collective in the firm. However, it was 
perceived to clash with the fast promotion of young staff. As one employee noted: ‘It might be that the 
douki networks in many Japanese firms are double edged swords. It is strongly connected and may 
mutually help, but there may be envy if top performers are promoted when they are young’. By contrast, 
the firm had several formal mechanisms to promote younger workers to relatively high positions, 
including headquarter managers and subsidiary board members, in direct contrast to traditional Japanese 
companies where seniority dictated a long wait for promotion. This included ashita-kaigi (translated as 
‘conference for tomorrow’) where selected teams of twenty to thirty employees compete in the decision 
making process in a training camp. Teams were ranked by the CEO at the end and winners and key 
group contributors are then offered new roles such as subsidiary heads. 
 
NewTelecommCo (NTC) was founded in 1981. Somewhat similarly to TechnoCo, the employment 
relations at NTC represented a combination of societal, dominance, and to a lesser extent, corporate 
effects. Somewhat surprisingly, societal effects were evident in the case of the retention of secure, long-
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term, employment, but the firm was non (and even anti)-union, reflective of US dominance effects 
(although traditionally Japanese SMEs have been far less likely to be unionized). Similar to TechnoCo, 
‘active’ shareholders were approximately 40% of the total and dominance effects were to a great extent 
represented by and through them. In fact, pay systems were also representative of US-styled dominance 
effects, being individualized and performance-based. Corporate effects were also evident in, for 
example, the particular mandates given to specific subsidiaries, similar to the situation at TechnoCo, and 
in the mixed model used in recruitment. 
 
NTC had undergone a rapid, and innovative, expansion programme. This has been achieved through a 
combination of organic growth and merger and acquisition activity. It bought, for example, major 
mobile network providers (domestically and overseas) and the firm was divided into three divisions: 
mobile, telecoms and broadband. The firm employed a total of 100,000 staff worldwide, including both 
the core organization and 1300 subsidiaries, 1000 of which were outside Japan. The subsidiaries in this 
case were generally acquired overseas operations. The core, Japan-based organization, employed 
19,000, including 4000 temporary staff. The expansion had been funded largely, and somewhat 
unorthodoxly, through bank lending from a variety of institutions, including foreign-owned ones. The 
firm had relied on financial techniques used in Anglo-American countries, for example, using non-
resource debts combined with a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which can be used as a way to finance a 
new venture without increasing the debt burden or diluting existing shareholdings. While the firm has 
three external directors (of 10), the founding CEO remains extremely dominant.  
 
The firm had a range of traditional and non-traditional employment practices. It had maintained a 
commitment to long term employment, seen as a core value of the firm, and employee turnover was low 
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at 2-3%. As the deputy director of HRM reported: ‘We are very similar to other Japanese companies in 
that we offer secure employment. That is the custom, we hesitate in laying off employees’. The firm was 
seen by employees as an exciting alternative employer to, for example, firms such as PrivatizedCo and 
recruited from top rank universities, as well as a high proportion of foreign students from Japanese 
universities. 
 
Given its rapid expansion the firm had not had to deal with a downturn. Despite the firm offering long-
term employment, younger respondents talked openly about how their future might well be outside of 
the company. One respondent spoke of a colleague who had recently left to study in the US and others 
had left for other employers. This new tendency amongst younger workers was also noted in the case of 
TechnoCo, and provides a contrasting social attitude to the ‘one company’ ethos previously held by 
salarymen in corporate Japan. Along with organization-specific drivers, this is also likely to be an 
expression of changing managerial labour markets and employee attitudes more widely in Japan. 
If employment tenure policies were fairly traditional at NTC, those related to pay and promotion were 
not. The company had a fairly flat structure of six grades and also recruited significant numbers of mid-
career hires, in part to meet the needs of the rapidly expanding business. In 2013, for example, the 
number of mid-career hires outnumbered graduate recruits. Promotion was relatively quick, compared to 
the two older case study companies, PrivatizedCo and MatureCo. While employees are typically not 
promoted to managerial level until their mid 30s, the youngest manager (kacho) was 28 and the 
youngers at the next level was 32 (bucho). However, employees were also demoted if they could not 
perform adequately at their grade. This was justified by senior managers on the grounds of the 
demotivating impact on all employees if they did not downgrade underperforming individuals. This 
stands in stark contrast to traditional practice. Demotion was used as a last resort, however, and 
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employees were moved horizontally first. While there was a standard basic plus bonus pay system 
(company-wide), and this was fairly uniform for lower grade staff (1 to 3), for managers it had 
significant implications for pay, of up to 30%. This was based on a performance appraisal system 
designed around management-by-objectives.  Further promotion was also based on performance across 
all grades. The company also had a large buffer of temporary employees (20%), as well as non-
managerial track staff in sales and administration. These positions were less well paid than career track 
staff, but were nevertheless recruited to with top quality graduates, typically females who did not wish to 
be promoted. The firm was non-union. 
 
Table 3 provides a brief summary of how the different SSDC effects have played out in each of the case 
firms. 
______________ Summary Table 3 about here_______________________________ 
Discussion 
In summary, there were noticeable variations regarding the relationship between corporate governance 
structure and employment relations practice across the five case studies. This emphasizes the tensions 
between societal and dominance effects which were often then mediated by strategic choices at the 
corporate level. These choices are informed but not determined by the specific meso-level institutional 
pressures that are experienced at organizational level. The SSDC framework is a relatively simple model 
but one that nevertheless allows for a layered evaluation of national diversity and a relatively integrated 
assessment of the key influences on organizations. The research evidence presented here provides strong 
support for the value of multiple levels of analysis. The importance of societal effects can be seen in the 
continued attachment to job security in four of the cases. It is also expressed in the continued importance 
attached by the large companies to human capital formation and to the enduring attraction of at least 
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long-term if not lifetime employment as a recruitment mechanism for employees given recent economic 
shifts in Japan. This was despite modifications to the operation of the lifetime employment system, 
notably that it applied to a narrower range of employees and was of a shorter duration than was common 
in the past due largely to Dominance Effects generated by ‘active’ foreign shareholders.  Moreover, 
younger managerial employees placed less importance on it, potentially reflecting the growth of mid-
career hires for Japanese firms. This also represents a considerable modification to the ‘tournament 
model’ of drawn out promotion (Koike, 2005; Owan, 2004).  
 
Consideration of our five cases demonstrates the interactive, multi-level and company-specific nature of 
the influences on employment relations practices as well as the importance of strategic choice at firm 
level. MatureCo and PrivatizedCo had introduced elements of more output-orientated approach to 
performance pay, but the amounts involved were relatively small and were tied to divisional 
performance rather than individual performance (Kato and Kodama, 2015). Seniority continued to be 
important, and societal effects and the dominant institutional influences of the organizational fields of 
these organizations had a strong influence on the relative continuity in employment relations. However, 
while performance did not impact greatly on pay, it had a greater impact on promotion. Previously, 
promotion to managerial level and beyond had been a fairly automatic process in large Japanese 
corporations such as these, but this was no longer the case and it was fairly directly linked with 
individual appraisal, and so individual performance had become indirectly linked to pay. TechnoCo and 
NTC had performance-related pay, and in these instances the corporate effects are much more readily 
apparent. Whereas MatureCo and PrivatizedCo adhered to dominant conventions of their organizational 
field, characterized by corporate inertia and strong trade unions, TechnoCo and NTC operated in new 
economic sectors and did not experience the same organizational influences and constraints. Indeed, 
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they were most influenced by those effects relevant to their own fields and these were more likely to be 
US-informed dominance effects. In these fields too, however, there was also evidence of corporate 
effects at play, witnessed by the differentiated but strategic use of subsidiaries at both Techno and NTC; 
the various effects and constraints informed but did not determine outcomes. There was also evidence of 
segmentation and layering in the nature of the effects themselves, with RetailCo the ‘outlier’ case study, 
having a high proportion of staff working part time, no commitment to long term employment and 
promotion based on merit, an example of specific meso-level institutional effects. In this sense, RetailCo 
were also adhering to the influences of their own organizational field in the growing Japanese retail 
sector where these practices have become increasingly established as the norm. 
 
As Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) notion of incumbents and challengers argument invokes (see also 
Sako 2007), TechnoCo and NTC, as relatively new high technology companies, might not have been 
expected to have ‘traditional’ practices. However, both had maintained a form of long-term 
employment. Such a commitment might have also been viewed as part of the influence of wider social 
norms (Society Effects), but may equally also be interpreted as corporate effects and the strategic 
choices taken because of them. That is, such effects may reflect moderating practices in the context of 
societal pressures on these firms as they seek to attract top-quality, graduate staff through the use of 
LTE. RetailCo, however was far less conditioned by such pressures. This is because the firm was 
operating in a different labour-market, indicating a different nature to the sedimentation (Cooper et al, 
1996), which was further enhanced by Dominance Effects favouring short term turnovers. 
 
The findings of this research provide finer grained insights into diversity within the economy and 
complement the existing research. Aoki et al (2007) as well as Jackson (2009) contend that corporate 
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governance is driving selective change in employment relations, resulting in a smaller core workforce 
and greater diversity in pay systems, but continued commitment to lifetime employment. Sako (2007) 
similarly argues that there is considerable difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ industries. Our findings 
are generally consistent with the overall arguments of these studies but our study offers important 
elaboration and nuance to these. For example, we found, somewhat in contrast with Aoki et al. (2007) 
and Jackson (2009), that corporate governance change was less obviously linked to changes in 
employment relations. We have conceptualized corporate governance structure as a part of an SSDC 
model and we have found significant variations in terms of the impact of ‘active’ shareholders 
(Dominance Effects). Significantly, we recognized other effects, particularly those deriving from Social 
and Corporate Effects, which in our case studies both moderated Dominance Effects and informed 
strategic choices at corporate level. Perhaps the most interesting way that the implications of corporate 
governance changes differed was in the use of subsidiaries. MatureCo and PrivatizedCo used their 
subsidiaries defensively to protect their core activities and workforce, whereas TechnoCo used its 
subsidiaries in a fairly innovative way, allowing them space to explore new products and services. The 
use of subsidiaries in corporate Japan merits further attention.  
 
Conclusions  
The central question of this article has been concerned with revisiting the relationship between corporate 
governance structure and employment relations practice in Japanese companies. Drawing on the recent 
work on institutional complexity (Greenwood et al 2011) and on the sedimented nature of organizational 
change (Cooper et al, 1996), we have articulated a layered assessment of the SSDC effects at play in 
corporate Japan. Our argument is that this differentiation across industries and organizations is a 
function both of strategic choice and also due in part to increasing variation in the meso-level 
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institutional pressures that are experienced at organizational level; that is, differentiation in the sources 
and nature of dominance effects that are relevant to that particular field.  
 
These findings demonstrate the value of a more sophisticated and agentic model of understanding 
corporate employment relations practices in contextthan, for example, the VOC model which, despite 
more recent developments, remains deterministic and ‘top down’.. The elaborated SSDC model provides 
for assessment of the forces influencing outcomes that stem from multiple levels, but also allows for the 
strategic action of individual firms operating in specific industry or sectors. The influence of complex 
meso-level institutional effects can be incorporated. The evidence presented here shows how individual 
corporate actors may respond strategically to differing dominance effects, while working within 
different organizational fields subject to the same situational logics, to produce a variety of outcomes 
within the same system and societal contexts (see Figure 1). 
 
Finally, this study provides  evidence of the value of the plurality of methodologies. Studies of 
employment relations in Japan often rely on large scale secondary data sources, which are particularly 
useful in that they are largely pre-compiled, typically by government, and offer widespread coverage 
which is representative. However, they lack the deeper analysis of interview-based studies such as this, 
and the nuances that they provide. For example, the data provided here would point to, at first glance, 
the continued resilience of lifetime employment and the demise of seniority-related pay, but probing of 
the data suggests that it is perhaps not as strong as the evidence would suggest and, conversely, that 
seniority may be more robust. In short, the case studies explore the underlying processes which are 
generating such patterns of change and continuity (Imai, 2011).   
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In conclusion, this article has refined the our understanding of the linkage between corporate governance 
structure and employment relations practice in Japanese companies. While changes in corporate 
governance structure have certainly impacted on companies, nonetheless, such impacts need to be 
contextualized together with other socio-economic factors. Furthermore, it has been shown that the 
exercise of strategic choice by companies has variously enhanced or moderated such factors. Future 
research would do well to draw on a plurality of methodologies and to deploy the multi-faceted SSDC 
framework in examining the complex inter-relationships between corporate governance and wider social 
and institutional influences and the consequences of these on employment relations at corporate level.  
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Table 1: Establishment of firms in related industries  
  Total 
before 
1948 
1949-
58 
1959-
68 
1969-
78 
1979-
88 
1989-
98 
1999-
2008 
2009- 
Information 
and 
Communication 
2,187  85  54  150  373  614  468  413  30  
Internet related 
service 
170  - 2  1  2  15  47  95  8  
Electronics 657  111  122  137  132  75  38  36  6  
Retailing 3,018  286  487  549  550  460  375  276  35  
Source: Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (2014) http://www.meti.go.jp/statistics/tyo/kikatu/result-2/h26data.html 
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Table 2: Size of firms in related industries 
  
Total 
  Capital 
30-50million 
50-
100million  
100-300million 
300- 
500million  
500- 
1 billion 
1-5billion  
5-
10billion 
≧ͳͲbillion 
  Electronics 
manufacturing 748 185 255 118 77 16 47 19 31 
Worker 
50-99 260 107 115 24 11 1 2 - - 
100-199 215 60 86 41 19 5 2 2 - 
200-299 90 12 31 22 14 3 6 1 1 
300-499 70 4 16 17 16 3 12 2 - 
500-999 56 1 6 10 12 2 20 5 - ≧ͳͲͲͲ 57 1 1 4 5 2 5 9 30(Mature) 
Information and 
Communication 2,490 525 800 572 252 113 156 27 45 
Worker 
50-99 846 267 344 148 57 15 14 1 - 
100-199 715 170 264 164 61 29 23 1 3 
200-299 322 44 110 96 36 14 17 1 4 
300-499 236 33 54 78 28 18 18 3 4 
500-999 199 8 20 56 44 21 40 4 6 ≧ͳͲͲͲ 172 3 8 30 26 16 44 17 28(NTC, Privatized) 
Internet related 197 13 41 48 28 23 33 5 6 
Worker 
50-99 82 8 24 25 16 4 5 - - 
100-199 54 2 7 13 6 13 12 1 - 
200-299 26 1 7 3 6 1 7 - 1 
300-499 15 - 2 4 - 3 2 3 1 
500-999 8 2 - 1 - 2 3 - - ≧ͳͲͲͲ 12 - 1 2 - - 4 1 (Techno) 4 
Retailing   3,587 955 1,355 624 246 78 209 55 65 
Worker 
50-99 718 334 303 60 17 2 2 - - 
100-199 872 305 392 122 33 10 10 - - 
200-299 486 139 215 78 35 2 13 3 1 
300-499 501 95 197 132 46 11 18 2 - 
500-999 434 55 155 98 61 17 33 12 3 
41 
 
≧ͳͲͲͲ 576 27 93 134 54 36 133 (Retail) 38 61 
 Source: Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (2015) http://www.meti.go.jp/statistics/tyo/kikatu/result-
2/h26data.html 
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Table 3: Summary of the SSDC Effects by Case Organization 
 
  
PrivatizedCo 
  
MatureCo 
  
RetailCo 
  
TechnoCo 
  
NewTelecommCo 
  
ER practice 
Continuity: ͚Core͛ 
and ͚periphery͛ 
Continuity: ͚Core͛ 
and ͚periphery͛ 
Change: Increasing 
flexibility 
Continuity: ͚Core͛ and 
͚periphery͛ 
Continuity: ͚Core͛ 
and ͚periphery͛ 
System Capitalism  
Society 
Strong pressure to 
keep long-term 
employment 
Strong pressure to 
keep long-term 
employment 
Weak pressure to 
keep long-term 
employment 
Moderate pressure to 
keep long-term 
employment 
Moderate pressure 
to keep long-term 
employment 
Dominance 
Weak pressure to 
adopt flexible 
employment 
practice 
Moderate pressure 
to adopt flexible 
employment practice 
Strong pressure to 
adopt flexible 
employment 
practice 
Strong pressure to 
adopt flexible 
employment practice 
Strong pressure to 
adopt flexible 
employment 
practice 
Corporate 
Strategic use of 
͚periphery͛ workers 
as ďuffer for ͚Đore͛ 
workers 
Strategic use of 
͚periphery͛ workers 
as ďuffer for ͚Đore͛ 
workers 
Strategic use of 
͚periphery͛ workers 
(heavily reliant on 
temporary workers) 
StrategiĐ use of ͚core͛ 
workers (maintain 
long-term 
employment) 
Strategic use of 
͚Đore͛ workers 
(maintain long-term 
employment) 
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Figure 1: Schematic of the System, Society, Dominance and Corporate (SSDC) Effects Model 
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